Finnish security expert Minna Ålander calls for a reliable supply of weapons from the West. Currently she does not see any negotiations with Moscow.

A Ukrainian soldier with a Soviet-made rocket launcher in Donbass in February 2024. Photo: Alina Smutko/Reuters

taz: Mrs Ålander, two years after the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, there is no end in sight. How is the Ukrainian army doing?

Minna Alander: Not very well. Ukraine has been struggling with ammunition shortages for a long time, and this is also noticeable on the front.

The example of Avdiivka in eastern Ukraine has shown that Ukraine cannot withstand a sustained siege by the Russian army. What does that mean?

Avdiivka shows how this war is currently developing. There are heavy battles in a few square kilometers. The front hasn't moved much since last summer. And you will also be able to see on the Russian side how the conquest of a small town is celebrated. It is a matter of meters and centimeters for both sides. In the case of Avdiivka, Ukraine had to surrender after a very long and hard fight. Russia has done better than we expected by increasing its own supplies. Additionally, Russia has been able to significantly expand and increase war production over the past two years. Despite Western sanctions. This is all bad news.

How strong is the Russian army really?

The truth lies somewhere in between. At the beginning of the war and especially before the big invasion, we overestimated the Russian army. Many Western countries thought that Ukraine had no chance against Russia. That is why they initially did not support Ukraine before the invasion. Even after February 24, 2022, support was very wavering. So many were surprised at how badly things went for Russia. Assessments of the state of the Russian army range from one extreme to the other.

But Russia has a larger pool of potential recruits when a new wave of mobilization hits. Thanks to North Korea, Iran and, in part, China, Russia has been able to increase war production. The weapons are not high tech, but they are still quite effective. Russia depends on the dough and, unfortunately, it works. We in the West should not underestimate Russia, but we should not overestimate it either.

What exactly does the Ukrainian army need?

Especially ammunition. But it also needs better air defense and even more missiles. This quickly brings the political borders of the West into play. Can and should it also strike deeper into Russian territory? If Ukraine gets F-16 fighter jets this year, it will make a difference. But it would also help to have more ground systems, not just battle tanks, but everything that comes with them. But in the end it all comes down to having sufficient quantities of ammunition. No single weapon system will decide the course of the war, but each system is part of the whole. Above all, support must be planned for the long term and sustained. Logistics chains must function in such a way that there are no gaps if there are failures between Western partners for political reasons.

What do you expect from Western allies?

Quick solutions are needed. The United States is currently causing the most concern. Unfortunately, support for Ukraine has become the topic of political events in the election year for a new US president. The decision made in the United States will be a question of the destiny of Europe. Can we and, above all, are we willing to increase our contribution now so that Ukraine can continue fighting? The security agreements with France, Germany and Great Britain are a very good sign that Europe is still aware.

But now these agreements must be filled with real content and actions. The words: “We will support Ukraine as long as necessary” should not remain empty words. But the question remains: Are the capabilities in Europe sufficient if we really have to pay the US contribution in case of emergency? That's very questionable at this point.

In Germany, the delivery of the Taurus cruise missiles has been discussed for months. Would such a weapon make sense from a military strategic perspective?

Yes absolutely. Missiles of all types are important for the defense of Ukraine. In this discussion the problem of constant supply emerges again. In Europe, stocks are not particularly large. Similar weapons are already used, such as the British Storm Shadow or the French Scalp. If the Taurus were added, the arsenal could be increased. It would make a significant difference for Ukraine if it could attack military targets on Russian territory. In the Foreign Ministry, people seem to think that this goes too far and that it increases the risk of escalation.

Doesn't this argument make sense to you? With a range of up to 500 kilometers, the Taurus can reach Russia.

No one can say if there will be a new type of climbing. Russia daily intensifies its attacks against the Ukrainian civilian population. Chancellor Scholz says Ukraine must not lose and Russia must not win, but not the other way around. And that makes a difference in the type of support you are willing to provide. Chancellor Scholz is apparently willing to support Ukraine in protecting its cities from Russian airstrikes.

But he is hesitant to support Ukraine enough to stop Russia from attacking Ukrainian cities. Personally, I think a nuclear escalation is very unlikely. I also think that Russia has no real interest in it. It is also true that Taurus will not decide the course of the war or even end it. But it would be enormously useful for Ukraine to also have this system and be able to increase its missile arsenal.

With the power of cruise missiles, Ukraine could also cut off supply routes to Crimea.

This would make sense from a military strategic point of view. It would then be possible to destroy the bridge to Crimea and eliminate the military infrastructure there. Crimea is an important point for Russia to attack Ukraine. Here too the question remains: Is Germany willing to support Ukraine to such an extent that Russia can be prevented from attacking further?

Shortly after February 24, 2022, Chancellor Scholz announced a turning point in Germany. To what extent did the importance of the NATO military alliance change with the war?

The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO was and is a moment of momentum. It strengthens NATO's role and demonstrates that the alliance offers the strongest deterrent. Unfortunately, we are currently in danger of the United States losing this momentum and letting it slip away. This is due to internal political games around support for Ukraine and, of course, former President Trump's recent statements about NATO partners falling short of the 2 percent goal. NATO's relevance is clear, but American instability has become a major problem.

What specifically does the accession of Finland, your country of origin, to NATO mean for the evolution of the Ukrainian war?

Finnish participation changes practically everything, especially in the Baltic Sea region. The big question for NATO was how to effectively defend the Baltic States in an emergency. This issue is now being clarified with the accession of Finland and Sweden, especially for long-term planning. In addition, NATO is preparing regional defense plans for the first time since the Cold War. This planning is much easier if Finland and Sweden are full members. Finland has maintained its national defense capabilities over the years.

This complicates the situation in Russia much more. If there were an attack on the Baltics, Russia would have to take into account the long border with Finland, which runs from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic. That's a big difference from before. That is why Russia is unlikely to attack the Baltic States in the near future.

Strengthen NATO, on the one hand. On the other hand, do you also see the time for a true common defense and security policy in the EU?

The need exists, and now what matters are the next few years. The EU has provided direct military support to Ukraine, NATO has deliberately not done so directly, but the alliance countries are doing it bilaterally. The Ramstein format, a forum of several states that militarily support Ukraine, is also not a NATO format; rather, alliance states coordinate their assistance. The EU is not a military alliance, so it offers a different level of coordination for European countries. A division of labor between the EU and NATO can work well in managing escalation. If there is something positive in this gloomy situation, it is the new active role of the EU.

Modernization costs money and requires austerity measures. Do we have to accept that?

It will depend, on the one hand, on the budgetary situation of each country, but, on the other, also on its role in NATO's new defense plans. Not all alliance members have to invest in everything and not all can afford all military capabilities. Larger countries with stronger economies may need to invest in systems that benefit pan-European defense planning. However, economic pressure is currently extremely high everywhere. Investments in tanks or kindergartens? These will be difficult debates in some countries.

In others, the issue does not arise because the threat is perceived as more urgent. For example, in Finland it is clear that tanks are a prerequisite for the continuity of daycare centers. Defense spending will increase, but what will matter more than the amount will be what the money is spent on: whether half the defense budget consists of pension payments, for example. Good overall planning is also required here.

The war situation is chaos. Do you see a negotiation opportunity?

To carry out meaningful negotiations, we must first reach a point where Russia feels obliged to negotiate honestly. This moment is very far away. Currently, Russia cannot accept an independent Ukraine integrated into the West. That's why there are no compromise options here. Either each country has the sovereign right to decide whether it wants to join NATO or the EU, or no country does. Russia has used the Minsk process to its advantage to consolidate its positions in eastern Ukraine and also to enable a major invasion. Russia has also failed to respect older agreements, such as the Budapest Memorandum, which was intended to provide security guarantees to Ukraine. Therefore, at the moment there is no basis of trust to negotiate with Russia.